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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: EQUAL PROTECTION:
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo'-SEXUAL EQUALITY
UNDER THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Andra Pearldaughter *
Introduction
An assortment of laws, including constitutional provisions,
treaties, statutes, judicial decisions, and administrative regula-
tions, governs the relationship of Native Americans to the federal
and state governments.' This body of law reflects the vacillation
between two conflicting views of the proper role of Native
Americans in the dominant culture-separatism or assimilation.2
One line of cases, statutes, and administrative policies maintains
that Native American groups are sovereign entities and as such
should be permitted, if not encouraged, to preserve their separate
cultural identities and should not be forced to merge with white
society.' Although repeatedly acknowledged as sovereigns, the
powers of Indian tribes have also consistently been limited under
the rubric of their status as wards of the federal government.
In contrast, the theory of assimilation espouses the integration
of Native Americans, as other minorities, into the mainstream of
life in the United States.' However, such integration would in-
evitably lead to the destruction of the cultural identities of Native
Americans. Thus, Native Americans are put to a choice between
cultural extinction through integration and a special relationship
*J.D., 1977, Golden Gate University School of Law.
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Nancy C. Carter, Librarian, in the
preparation of this note.
1. See generally F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1942), for an overview of the statutes,
treaties, federal court cases, Department of the Interior rulings, and Attorney General opi-
nions relevant to the legal status of Native Americans in white society.
2. See Burnett, An Historical Analysis of the 1968 'Indian Civil Rights'Act, 9 HARV. J.
LEG. 557 (1972), for a comprehensive discussion of the history of Indian tribal sovereignty
which sets forth in detail the vacillation in national policy between assimilation and
separatism. Id. at 558-74. See also 21 STAN. L. REV. 1236, 1237-40 (1969), for a brief discus-
sion of these themes.
3. See, e.g., United States v. United States Fidelity Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940); Talton
v. Mayes, 162 U.S. 376 (1896); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
4. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1831).
5. See Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388;
Indian Citizenship Act, 8 U.S.C. § 3(c) amended8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) (1970); Pub. L. 93-
280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, asamended18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360 (1970).
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with the federal government which buffers the effects of white
society but which also impinges on native self-government.'
The most recent major federal legislation concerning Native
Americans, the Indian Civil Rights Act,7 reflects a compromise
between the assimilative and separatist approaches.' Congress, ex-
ercising its plenary authority over Native Americans, imposed on
tribal governments specific restraints taken almost verbatim from
the Bill of Rights.' Thus, Congress attempted to further the
assimilation of Native Americans by the extension of many in-
dividual rights to tribal members that have long been guaranteed
to all other American citizens. Omitted out of deference to
cultural differences were the first amendment requirement of
nonestablishment of religion and the fifteenth amendment pro-
hibition of racial classification in voting.
The rights accorded Native Americans in their relations with
federal and state governments are the same as those of any
6. See E. CAHN. OUR BROTHERS KEEPER: THE INDIAN IN WHITE AMERICA 14 (1969), for a
discussion of this dilemma.
7. A:t of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 77, codifiedat 25 U.S.C. §§
1301-1303 (1970).
8. See generally Burnett, supra note 2, at 574 -614, 617, for a thorough treatment of the
differing philosophies of supporters and opponents of the Indian Civil Rights Act and the
legislative compromises resulting from these conflicts. See also Note, The Indian Bill of
Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV L. REV 1343 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Constitutional Status 1. The congressional attitude toward
assimilation is specifically discussed. Id. at 1359-60.
9. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970), which sets forth the individual rights guaranteed by the Act,
provides: "§ 1302 Constitutional rights.
"No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-
"(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition for a redress of grievances;
" (2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be search-
ed and the person or thing to be seized;
"(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
"(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
"(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
"(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public trial, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his
own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense;
"(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual punishments,
and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment
greater than imprisonment for a term of six months or a fine of $500, or both;
"'(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive
any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
"(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
"(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right,
upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons. (Pub. L. 90-284, title II, § 202,
Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 77)"
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American citizen.'" However, prior to the enactment of the Indian
Civil Rights Act, the federal judicial doctrine of constitutional im-
munity had exempted tribal governments from constitutional
restraints in their exercise of power over tribal members." Conse-
quently, most tribal governments had not extended certain in-
dividual rights to tribal members.'" This was partially due to the
lack of the necessary finances and education.'" Another significant
factor, though, was the abiding concept of separate ethnic com-
munities which had as an important goal the retention of cultures
developed in a context entirely different from that of Anglo-
American constitutional history.'4
10. See, e.g., Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P.2d 456 (1948); Montoya v.
Bolack, 70 N.M. 196, 372 P.2d 387 (1962). United States citizenship was granted to Native
Americans by an Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253.
11. See Note, Constitutional Status, supra note 8, at 1346-53. The author discusses the
history of the constitutional immunity doctrine and the impact of the Indian Civil Rights
Act on it.
12. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (sixth amendment right to grand
jury); Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959)
(first amendment freedom of religion); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir.
1958) (fifth amendment due process); Glover v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 19 (D. Mont.
1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel). This situation was viewed as offensive by many
Anglo-Americans. However, some commentators deplore the extent to which the Indian
Civil Rights Act will undermine the autonomy of the Indian tribes. They argue the effect
will be to usurp yet another area from tha already limited jurisdiction of the tribal courts
and make the federal courts the final arbiter. See, e.g., Note, Equitable and Declaratory
Relief Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 48 N.D.L. REV. 695 (1972). The authors of this
note direct their attention to the availability of equitable and declaratory relief under the
Indian Civil Rights Act, and suggest possible ways to minimize its undermining impact on
tribal autonomy. See also Ziontz, In Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Judicial
Error in Construction of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 20 S.D.L. REv. 1 (1975); Note, An
Analysis of the Indian Bill of Rights, 33 MONT. L. REV. 255 (1972), which also takes the
position that the Indian Civil Rights Act is a blatant imposition of white values on Native
American culture, destructive of tribal sovereignty and self-government.
But see, de Raismes, The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the Pursuit of Responsible
Tribal Self-Government, 20 S.D.L. REv. 59 (1975); Note, Tribal Injustice: The Red Lake
Court of Indian Offenses, 48 N.D.L. REV. 639 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Tribal In-
justice]. The author argues forcefully for application of the Indian Civil Rights Act because
of the inadequacies of the tribal court system. These inadequacies include the selection of
judges as part of a spoils system, the courts' lack of independence from the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, and the partiality engendered by tribal politics. The author notes that, ironically,
this system is now defended by many as a preserver of tradition although it was originally
designed to eradicate the historic way of life of the Native American people. He attacks the
tribal sovereignty argument by observing that all tribal legislation must be approved by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs and that no tribe could long exist without federal aid. He con-
cludes that the tribal court he is considering could comply with the Indian Civil Rights Act
without diminishing the present state of that tribe's sovereignty.
13. See Commission on the Rights, Liberties, & Responsibilities of the American Indian,
THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 37 (W. Brophy & S. Aberle eds. 1966); Burnett,
supra note 2, at 581; Note, The Constitutional Rights of the American Indian, 51 VA. L.
REV. 121, 138 (1965).
14. SeeNote, Constitutional Status, supra note 8, at 1344.
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Conflicts have inevitably arisen as the preservation of native
cultural integrity and the promotion of Anglo-American constitu-
tional ideals have been considered by the courts. Illustrative of
this conflict is the case of Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo.'" The
Martinez Court considered a question of first impression: whether
an ordinance differentiating between the rights of tribal members
on the basis of sex was violative of the equal protection clause of
the Indian Civil Rights Act.',
Facts of Martinez
Plaintiffs Julia Martinez and her daughter Audrey Martinez
brought suit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
to challenge the membership ordinance of the Santa Clara Pueblo
in New Mexico. The ordinance granted membership to all children
15. 08 S.Ct. 1670 (1978).
16. This is the first time that discrimination on the basis of sex by an Indian tribe has
been considered. However, membership ordinances have previously been attacked for
reasons other than sex discrimination.
In Laramie v. Nicholson, 487 F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1973), the plaintiffs were children whose
mother; were members of the Colville Confederated Tribe. The children were refused
enrollment in the tribe solely because they had been previously enrolled as members of
another tribe. The children met all other requirements for membership. The plaintiffs also
alleged that others with the same supposed disqualification were allowed to enroll as
members of the tribe. The trial court found no jurisdiction under the Indian Civil Rights
Act, but the appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 316. The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to Laramie in Tonasket v. Thompson, 419
U.S. 8,71 (1974). Evidently, Laramie was consolidated with Tonasket, a case which
presented the same issue and was decided by the same Ninth Circuit panel.
The 3laintiffs in Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971),
alleged the discriminatory application of a membership ordinance requiring one-quarter
degree Indian blood. The court found that the plaintiffs could not invoke the Indian Civil
Rights Act where the pleadings showed that the tribal council had acted in accord with the
ordinance, which was not itself under attack. Thus, no jurisdiction existed under which the
court could consider the claim. Id. at 282.
The case of Yellow Bird v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 380 F. Supp. 438 (D.S.D. 1974), also in-
volved an equal protection challenge to a tribal membership provision. In that case, the
court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the case. The plaintiffs sought to run as candidates for tribal office in the Oglala
primary election. The Oglala Sioux tribal election board refused to place their names on the
ballot, .evidently on the grounds that the plaintiffs were barred from tribal membership by a
tribal constitutional provision which restricted membership to children born to tribal
members who were residents of the reservation at the time of the child's birth.
The court found that absent allegations that membership provisions were not uniformly
applied, such provisions were not subject to the equal protection requirements of the Indian
Civil Rights Act. Thus, the court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under the Act. Id. at 440-41.
See also Note, Equal Protection Under the Indian Civil Rights Act: Martinez v. Santa
Clara Pueblo, 90 HARV. L. REV. 627 (1977). The author of this note considers Martinez
from the perspective of another membership ordinance case requiring the resolution of
cultural autonomy with application of the Indian Civil Rights Act. However, he does not
consider seriously the philosophical problems raised by the conflict between invidious
discrimination and cultural autonomy.
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born of marriages between male members of the Pueblo and non-
members, while denying membership to all children born of mar-
riages between female members of the Pueblo and nonmembers.1
The primary motivation for passage of the ordinance in 1939 was
the fear of the economic consequences of a marked increase in the
Pueblo's population caused by a sharp rise in intermarriage.'"
Prior to its enactment, membership in the Pueblo for children of
mixed marriages had been determined on an individual basis."
Plaintiff Julia Martinez, whose parents were Santa Clarans, is a
member of the Pueblo. Her husband is a fullblood Navajo and is
not a member of the Pueblo." Their eight living children, in-
cluding plaintiff Audrey Martinez, are, as a result of the or-
dinance, barred from membership in the Pueblo. The Martinezes
have lived at the Pueblo continuously since their marriage in 1941.
All of the Martinez children were reared at the Pueblo; all speak
Tewa, the traditional and official language of the Pueblo; all are
allowed to practice the traditional religion. Culturally, the Mar-
tinez children are an integral part of the Pueblo.2' Since 1946, Mrs.
Martinez has attempted to enroll her children in the Pueblo
through all procedures available under the Pueblo government."
When she exhausted the tribal remedies, she and her daughter filed
suit in the federal district court in New Mexico.
Plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance deprived nonmember
children of various rights, including residence at the Pueblo as a
17. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1040 -41 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd; 98
S.Ct. 1670 (1978). The ordinance is as follows: "Be it ordained by the Council of the Pueblo
of Santa Clara, New Mexico, in regular meeting duly assembled, that hereafter the follow-
ing rules shall govern the admission to membership to the Santa Clara Pueblo;
1. All children born of marriages between members of the Santa Clara Pueblo shall be
members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
2. All children born of marriages between male members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and
non-members shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
3. Children born of marriages between female members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-
members shall not be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
4. Persons shall not be naturalized as members of the Santa Clara Pueblo under any cir-
cumstances." Appellants are attacking sub-paragraphs 2 and 3 of the ordinance.
18. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1040 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98
S.Ct. 1670 (1978).
19. Id.
20. Martinez's marriage to a Native American, although a member of a different tribe,
may seem less serious than marriage to a non-Indian. However, this is significant only from
an Anglo-American view of pan-Indianism, which is not a pervasive Native American no-
tion. See generally H. HERTZBERG, THE SEARCH FOR AN AMERICAN INDIAN IDENTITY 1-12
(1971), for a discussion of the attempts to organize pan-Indian movements, the need for
such a cohesive political response, and the diversity of Native American cultures causing
such attempts to fail.
21. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1041 (10th Cir. 1976).
22. Id.
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matter of right; political rights such as voting, holding secular of-
fice, and bringing matters before the Pueblo Council; and sharing
in the material benefits of Pueblo membership by using the land
and hunting and fishing.' Plaintiffs also contended the ordinance
prevented Mrs. Martinez from passing her possessory interest in
Pueblo property to her children."
Decision of the District Court
The trial court found that under the Indian Civil Rights Act it
had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims.' Moreover, it held that
the ordinance did not violate the Indian Civil Rights Act.2" The
court based this conclusion on its holding that the equal protection
provision of the Indian Civil Rights Act was not coextensive with
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. "[Tihe Act and
its equal protection guarantee must be read against the back-
ground of tribal sovereignty and interpreted within the context of
tribal laws and customs."' Accordingly, it reasoned that courts
should not invalidate tribal membership ordinances which use
classifications based on criteria traditionally employed by the
tribe in considering membership questions, even though such
classifications might be unacceptable under constitutional stan-
dards.'
Judge Mechem treated the patrilineal and patrilocal traditions of
the Pueblo as indications of a cultural tradition which made accept-
able the male-female distinctions in classifying children of mixed
marriages as members or nonmembers. " He also recognized the
Pueblo's economic and cultural interests in membership policies
generally and in the 1939 ordinance specifically."0 If the Pueblo's
ability to define Santa Clara membership "is limited or restricted
by an external authority, then a new definition of what it is to be a
Santa Claran is imposed, and the culture of Santa Clara is in-
evitably changed."'" Additionally, he noted the interrelation of the
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.NM. 1975). The Tenth Circuit
had not ruled on the issue of jurisdiction under the Indian Civil Rights Act at that time. The
district court discussed the relevant authorities at length in concluding jurisdiction existed.
Id. at 7-11.
26. Id. at 18.
27. Id. at 17, citing Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, 506 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir.
1974); Means v. Russell, 383 F. Supp. 378 (D.S.D. 1974).
28. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 18 (D.N.M. 1975).
29. IM. at 16.
30. I'. at 15, 16.
31. d. at 15.
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economic and cultural interests, pointing out that economic sur-
vival is a prerequisite to maintaining cultural autonomy and iden-
tity.
Decision of the Appellate Court
Writing for the Tenth Circuit, Judge Doyle reversed the district
court's decision. 2 The Martinez panel considered three issues in its
analysis: (1) sovereign immunity and jurisdiction; (2) the test for
violations of equal protection under the Act; and (3) whether the
ordinance survived the equal protection challenge.
The court held that federal jurisdiction existed and that to the
extent the Indian Civil Rights Act applied, tribal immunity was
thereby limited." The Act was designed to provide protection
against tribal authority" and therefore a congressional intent to
allow suits against the tribe was essential to the goal of protection.
To hold otherwise would reduce the Act to a mere unenforceable
declaration of principles.
The Martinez panel held that a balancing test which weighs the
32. Martintez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1048 (10th Cir. 1976).
33. Id. at 1042. The Martinez panel upheld jurisdiction and found that sovereign im-
munity was waived, almost without discussion, on the basis of its decision in Dry Creek
Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975). Dry Creek Lodge was decided a
few weeks prior to the district court's decision in Martinez(June 25, 1975).
In Dry Creek Lodge, the court notes that the general issue of jurisdiction under the In-
dian Civil Rights Act had been before the Tenth Circuit on three occasions. However, those
courts never reached the present issue. (515 F.2d 926, 933 (10th Cir. 1975)). In McCurdy v.
Steele, 506 F.2d 653, 656 (10th Cir. 1974), the court refrained from ruling on jurisdiction
under Section 1302 because the plaintiffs had not exhausted tribal remedies. The complaint
in Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278, 281-82 (10th Cir. 1971), failed to
disclose a denial of due process or equal protection. Thus, since the Indian Civil Rights Act
was not brought into play, the court found there was no jurisdiction. In Groundhog v.
Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971), plaintiffs challenged the statutory provision for the
appointment of a tribal chief by the Secretary of the Interior. The Groundhog court found
there was no jurisdiction because the complaint was so lacking in substance and so contrary
to well -established law enunciating the power of Congress to legislate concerning Native
American affairs as to afford no substantial basis for a claim of federal jurisdiction. 1d. at
678. The Dry Creek Lodge panel then turned to the opinions of other circuits from which it
concluded jurisdiction existed under the Indian Civil Rights Act, in conjunction with 42
U.S.C. § 1343. 515 F.2d 926, 933 n.6 (10th Cir. 1975).
In considering the issue of sovereign immunity, the Dry Creek Lodge court summarily
held the Indian Civil Rights Act functioned as a waiver by Congress of any immunity. Id.
at 934 n.9, citing Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Lower
Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1973); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700
(8th Cir. 1973); Loncaission v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370 (D.N.M. 1971); Seneca Constitu-
tional Rights Organization v. George, 348 F. Supp. 48 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); McCurdy v.
Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973). The Martinez panel adopted this position, relying
on Dry Creek Lodge. Even though the circuit court considered the issue of sovereign im-
munity, it was not mentioned in the district court opinion.
34. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1042 (10th Cir. 1976).
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tribal interest against the individual's right to fair treatment under
the law is appropriate under the equal protection provision of the
Indian Civil Rights Act.s Using this test, Judge Doyle applied a
compelling interest standard and found the Pueblo's interest in the
ordinance not to be compelling."'
In determining the appropriate test, the Martinez court con-
sidered the legislative history of the Indian Civil Rights Act, as
well as case law. 7 The Act emerged from a series of congressional
bills designed to safeguard Native Americans' constitutional
rights. One bill, S. 961,38 provided that an Indian tribe, in exercis-
ing its powers of local self-government, was subject to the same
limitations and restraints as those imposed on federal and state
governments by the Constitution. Senator Sam Ervin, sponsor of
S. 961, stated that the bill was intended to guarantee to individual
Indians the same rights that other American citizens had under the
Constitution.39 It was pointed out by other supporters that off-
reservation Native Americans enjoyed the same rights as other
American citizens, but on the reservation their rights depended
upon the benevolence of tribal governments."0 The comprehensive
extension of rights was rejected, however, when further considera-
tion indicated that this approach could undermine tribal structure.
For example, giving equality in voting rights might conflict with
the recognized power of the tribes to set blood quantum re-
quirements for membership and voting." Also, the first amend-
ment nonestablishment clause would have endangered the con-
tinued existence of Pueblo theocracies.42 While problems were seen
in extending some constitutional guarantees, none were suggested
with respect to equal protection. In fact, it was frequently
characterized as a basic or fundamental right among the
guarantees.
35. Ia at 1045.
36. Ia. at 1047.
37. See generally Burnett, supra note 2, at 574 -614, for extensive commentary on the
legislative history of the Indian Civil Rights Act. See also Ziontz, supra note 12, at 3-20; de
Raismes, supra note 12, at 72-76; Reiblich, Indian Rights Under the Civil Rights Act of
1968, 10 ARIz. L. REV. 617, 621-23 (1968).
38. See S. REP. No. 841, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6(1967).
39. 113 CONG. REC. 35473 (1967).
40. See, e.g., Hearings on Constitutional Rights of American Indians Before the Sub-
comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1 (1962), 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1963), 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3 (1963),
and 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4 (1964) 3, 8, 286, 447 [hereinafter cited as 1961-63 Hearings];
Hearings on S. 961-68 and 5.. Res. 40, Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 165, 221 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as 1965 Hearings].
41. 1965Hearings, supra note 40, at 65, 221.
42. Id.
43. E.g., 1965 Hearings, supra note 40, at 18, 61.
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In the subcommittee on constitutional rights of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, there were conflicting statements regarding
the need to refrain from undermining tribal authority. The sub-
committee members stated at hearings, in Committee reports, and
in floor debates their intent to extend broad constitutional protec-
tions to individual Indians." Yet, once cognizant of the negative
consequences of a comprehensive extension of constitutional
guarantees, the original bill was amended to delete the
nonestablishment clause and the fifteenth amendment, as well as
to specify the guarantees granted from the first amendment, the
fourth through eighth amendments, and the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment." In this amended form, S.
961 became the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.
From this investigation of the legislative history, the court con-
cluded that congress had individually considered the various pro-
tections contained in the Bill of Rights. Those considered essential
and workable were retained, while those deemed out of harmony
with Native American culture were eliminated." The legislative
history contained some evidence that Congress had anticipated
that in an evaluation such as Martinez the cultural autonomy and
integrity of the tribes would be weighed.17 However, the court
perceived nothing in the legislative history that resembled a for-
mula for resolution of these conflicting interests."
The Martinez panel concluded that the only way to resolve a
conflict between constitutional values and tribal traditions was to
consider the scope, extent, and importance of the tribal interest.
Against this, the individual's right to fair treatment under the law,
in light of the clearness of the guarantee and the magnitude of the
interest, both generally and as applied to the particular facts, was
to be weighed." Recognition of the specific constitutional
guarantee, unless the value of the tribal custom or principle
outweighed it, was thereby found to be compatible with congres-
sional intent as manifested in the legislative proceedings."
The court next considered case law concerning equal protection
under the Indian Civil Rights Act. Many cases had concluded that
44. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1044 (10th Cir. 1976).
45. S. 1843; passed unanimously, 113 CONG. REC. 35471-77 (1967).
46. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1044 (10th Cir. 1976.) See also
Burnett, supra note 2, at 574-604 and Note, Constitutional Status, supra note 8, at 1359-
60.
47. Id. at 1045. See also Burnett, supra note 2, at 574-604 and Note, Constitutional
Status, supra note 8, at 1360.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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Congress did not intend the equal protection provision of the In-
dian Civil Rights Act to be coextensive with the constitutional
guarantee. Cases challenging blood quantum requirements for
tribal membership or office-holding exemplify this.' The court
distinguished the blood quantum requirement cases as having
"some semblance of basis for the classification," unlike the sex
discrimination of the present case. 2 The Tenth Circuit also noted
that other courts considering the equal protection provision of the
Act invariably looked to the fourteenth amendment for guidance.
The line of election requirement cases which dealt with age and
residency requirements for voting and holding office, apportion-
ment of tribal legislatures, and irregularities in the conduct of elec-
tions are illustrative. 3 The Martinez panel "conceded that under
the fourteenth amendment the ordinance would clearly be invalid
because of its classification scheme based solely on sex."" In con-
51. See Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971); Daly v.
United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973).
52. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1046 (10th Cir. 1976).
53. See Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976) and Two
Hawk v Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 404 F. Supp. 1327 (D.S.D. 1975) (residency requirements);
Means v. Russell, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975) (election irregularities); Wounded Head v.
Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1975) (age requirement); Daly
v. United States, 478 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973) and White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d
1311 (8th Cir. 1973) (reapportionment).
54. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1046 (10th Cir. 1976). During the
years of the Warren Court, a dual-level equal protection analysis evolved. Usually, the ra-
tional relationship standard was applied, which required merely that the classification be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. Almost any relationship alleged
by the state was sufficient. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday
closing laws upheld). When a suspect classification or fundamental right was involved,
however, a compelling state interest was required to sustain the classification. See, e.g.,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one-year residency requirement for welfare ap-
plicants :struck down).
With the advent of the Burger Court, there was a shift in analysis. In seven cases during
the 1971 Term, the Court found substantial bases for constitutional challenges even though
the traditional rational relationship criteria were recited. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Since then, the Burger Court has
continued to find constitutional violations on old equal protection grounds. See, e.g.,
Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). Gerald Gunther attempts to explicate this
trend in Foreword In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). Justice Marshall's concurrence in
Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973), sheds some light on these
developments. He sets forth a "sliding scale" theory of equal protection which considers the
impact of the rule on the individual, the nature of the right involved, the invidiousness of
the classification, the governmental interest at stake, and possible safeguards or less restric-
tive alternatives. Marshall notes this approach utilizes traditional elements from both due
process and equal protection. Perhaps this explains the Court's reliance on Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Although a plurality of the Court in Frontiero held sex to
be a suspect category, it is inaccurate, based on Frontiero, to say, without more, that a
classification predicated solely on sex violates equal protection. The Court also refers the
reader to Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, and Reed v.
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trast, the district court had not given cognizance to the sex
discrimination issue.
Despite its conclusion that equal protection standards did not
apply with full force, the Tenth Circuit discussed the facts of
Martinez in light of whether the tribal interest was compelling.
The court noted that the use of the membership classification was
of relatively recent origin and, when applied, it caused in-
congruous and unreasonable results." Rejecting as conclusory the
district court's characterization of the Santa Clara culture, the ap-
peals court deemed reliance on the supposed patrilineal and
patrilocal nature of the Pueblo an inappropriate justification of
the ordinance. 6 Additionally, the ordinance was found not to
represent Santa Clara tradition. Prior to its passage, the children
of Santa Clara women in mixed marriages were sometimes admit-
ted to Pueblo membership. 7 The ordinance was actually the pro-
duct of economic concerns which could have been addressed by
other, nondiscriminatory solutions:"
Through this analysis, the court concluded that the ordinance
was repugnant to the equal protection provision of the Indian
Civil Rights Act. To have let the ordinance stand, as in disclaim-
ing jurisdiction, would have rendered the Indian Civil Rights Act
ineffectual except as an abstract statement of principle."0
Decision of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, reversed
the decision of the appellate court, finding that the Indian Civil
Rights Act neither expressly nor implicitly authorized civil actions
for declaratory or injunctive relief to enforce its substantive provi-
sions.' Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion."1
The Court first addressed the issue of the sovereign immunity of
the tribe. Unlike the appellate court, which found that tribal im-
munity was limited to the extent that the substantive portions of
Reed,404 U.S. 71 (1971). Each of these cases struck down classifications based solely on sex.
The Martinez panel did not clearly set forth the level of scrutiny it used to invalidate the
classification. Although it alluded to the need for a compelling interest, it also discussed the
factors set forth by Marshall in Murry. Perhaps this is an example of the "newer" equal
protection theorized by Gunther.
55. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1047 (10th Cir. 1976).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1048.
60. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 98 S.Ct. 1670 (1978).
61. Id. at 1684.
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the Act were applicable, Justice Marshall concluded that the doc-
trine of tribal sovereign immunity bars suits against the tribe ab-
sent an express waiver by Congress. Because the Indian Civil
Rights Act contains no such waiver, the Court held that the
federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear an action aginst the tribe
pursuant to the Act.6" Despite the lack of jurisdiction, the Court
conceded that the Act had modified the substantive law applicable
to the tribe.0
The Court then examined whether the Act impliedly authorized
a private right of action against tribal officers for declaratory and
injunctive relief. Cort v. Ash4 stated the test for determining
whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly pro-
viding one. The four relevant factors enumerated in Cort are the
following: (1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose
benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there is an indication
of the legislative intent to create or deny such a remedy; (3)
whether it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply a remedy; (4) whether the cause of ac-
tion is one traditionally relegated to state [or tribal] law, in an area
basically the concern of the states [or tribes], so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a federal cause of action."
The Court conceded that the plaintiff was a member of the class
intended to be benefitted by the Act. The Court next considered
whether a private right of action would be consistent with the pur-
poses of the Act. The majority found that Congress had pursued
two goals in the Act: the strengthening of the position of in-
dividual tribal members vis-a-vis the tribal government, and the
protecting and furthering of native self-governmen t. 7 The Court
believed the creation of a federal cause of action would undermine
the latter goal by eroding the authority of the tribal courts and im-
posing serious financial burdens on the already financially disad-
vantaged tribes.' Thus, the omission of a private right of action
was interpreted as Congress' method of balancing these two com-
peting interests and implying a right of action would not be consis-
tent with the goals of Congress. 9
62. kI. at 1677, relying on United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976).
63. 9t3 S.Ct. 1670, 1677 (1978).
64. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
65. Id. at 78.
66. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1678 (1978).
67. Id. at 1679, 1680.
68. Id. at 1680, 1681. However, the Court seems to ignore that most individual Native
Americans seeking enforcement of Section 1302 would be as financially disadvantaged as
the tribe if not more so.
69. Id. at 1681.
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In contrast, Justice White believed there was no inconsistency.
His dissent cites portions of the legislative history which he found
to indicate Congress' concern, not only about Native Americans'
lack of substantive rights, but also about the lack of remedies to
enforce whatever rights she or he might have.'
In looking to the third relevant factor established in the Cort
test, the Court further reviewed the legislative history of the Indian
Civil Rights Act. Congress considered and rejected three different
proposals for federal review in a civil context. The first proposal
was de novo review by federal courts of criminal convictions by
tribal courts. Instead, the habeas corpus provision of Section 1303
was adopted.7' The second consisted of an administrative pro-
cedure whereby the Department of the Interior would review
alleged civil violations of the Act and make referrals to the At-
torney General for bringing suit.' The last proposal, offered as a
substitute for the second, would have authorized adjudication of
civil complaints by the Department of the Interior with review by
the district courts.'3 The Court found that the rejection of these
proposals indicated an intent to deny a private remedy.'
Justice White found the rejection of the first proposal to be of
limited relevance to the civil context because it involved criminal
convictions. Also, the habeas corpus remedy was adopted rather
than the original because the degree of intrusion was less. He
opined that the degree of intrusion permitted by a private cause of
action in the civil context would be no greater than that of the
habeas corpus remedy.'
The rejection of administrative review with initiation of suits by
the Attorney General was not a persuasive indication to Justice
White of a rejection of federal judicial review.' ° Moreover,
testimony indicated that the focus of this suggestion was off-
reservation violations by non-Indians, e.g., illegal detention of
reservation Indians by state and tribal officials; arbitrary decision
making by the Bureau of Indian Affairs; and denial of various
state welfare services to Native Americans living off the reserva-
tion. Two witnesses did express the fear of disruption of tribal
governments by the suggested procedure, but many others ex-
70. Id. at 1686-90.
71. Id. at 1687.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1683.
75. Id. at 1686.
76. Id.
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pressed the view that the Attorney General already possessed the
authority to bring suits.77
The last proposal had been made in tandem with a provision
that allowed the appeal of criminal convictions in the tribal court
to the Secretary of the Interior, who could affirm, modify, or
reverse the tribal decision. Most of the discussion concerning this
joint proposal centered on the review of criminal proceedings and
consequently was of limited relevance to congressional views on
civil remedies. Further, several witnesses expressed objections to
appeals from judicial proceedings to the executive branch. ; Justice
White concluded these rejections were of limited significance
because the proposals primarily involved criminal convictions and
because . many objections to them, other than tribal autonomy,
were raised.
Finally, the Court considered the appropriateness of a federal
forum to vindicate the rights in question. The Court reasoned that
tribal courts, which were recognized as appropriate forums for ad-
judicating disputes concerning both Native Americans and non-
natives, were available for the enforcement of the substantive pro-
visions of the Act.7" Thus, contrary to the holding of the Tenth
Circuit, a federal cause of action was not plainly required to give
effect to the extension of constitutional norms to tribal govern-
ments.' Furthermore, the Court declared that Congress, in not ex-
posing tribal officials to suit, "may have considered" that civil ac-
tions would frequently depend on questions of tribal traditions
which tribal forums might be in a better position to evaluate.'
Justice White responded that it was both unrealistic and in con-
travention of Congress' intent to suggest that the tribal body
which had allegedly violated an individual's rights was the ap-
propriate forum for the adjudication of that alleged deprivation."2
In closing, he noted that the majority had acknowledged the
Court's frequent recognition of the propriety of inferring a federal
cause of action for the enforcement of civil rights. 3
Thus, after review of the legislative history, the majority found
that Congress was committed to the goal of tribal self-
determination and that creation of a federal cause of action would
77. kI. at 1687.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1681.
80. I at 1680.
81. M at 1684.
82. M at 1689.
83. Id. at 1690.
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not comport with this goal. Because tribal courts are available to
adjudicate disputes arising under the Act, creation of a cause of
action is not plainly required. The rejection of various proposed
remedies indicated the belief of Congress that habeas corpus
would protect the individual interests at stake while avoiding
needless intrusion on tribal governments.
In contrast, the legislative history demonstrated to Justice White
that Congress was as concerned with providing remedial relief as
with changing the substantive law of the tribes. The relevance of
the rejection of various proposals was very limited, particularly
since most dealt with criminal convictions. Finally, reliance on
tribal courts as forums was unrealistic due to their dual roles as
legislative and judicial institutions, and such reliance was inconsis-
tent with Congress' intent to extend constitutional protections.
Criticism of the Court's Decision
The enforcement of the Indian Civil Rights Act and the exten-
sion of federal constitutional protections to Native American
citizens dictate some intervention of the dominant culture into the
affairs of native cultures. As Justice White pointed out, "The ex-
tension of constitutional rights to individual citizens is intended to
intrude upon the authority of government.""s The majority seems
unable to accept that such legislation must have as a basic
presumption that the status of Native American tribes is little dif-
ferent from that of the states, or alternatively, Native American
groups deserve no greater recognition than that given to other
cultural groups such as the Amish.'
84. Id. at 1689 (emphasis in original).
85. Some commentators have argued that the position of Native Americans is analogous
to that of the Amish people in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, the
Supreme Court upheld the right of Amish parents to be exempt from the Wisconsin com-
pulsory education law under a first amendment "free exercise of religion" rationale. The
Amish community does not enjoy the same long-standing recognition of sovereign status
accorded to Native Americans. No treaty or other obligation exists between the United
States or the state of Wisconsin and the Amish people, unlike the relationship between the
United States and Native Americans. Also, religion and culture are either interdependent or
equivalent for Native American tribes. Thus, an even stronger argument than that made by
Amish parents could be made by Native Amercans that they have a right to a separate
mode of life.
Even if the principle of Yoder were found to limit application of the Indian Civil Rights
Act, Native Americans would bear a heavy burden in making out a free exercise claim. The
showing necessary in Yoderto sustain such a claim included (1) the law in question gravely
endangered or destroyed the free exercise of the religious beliefs; (2) a long history as an
identifiable religious sect; (3) a long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of
American society; (4) a convincing demonstration of the sincerity of the religious beliefs;
(5) a demonstration of the interrelationship between the religious belief and the mode of
life; (6) a persuasive showing of the vital role the belief plays in the survival of the com-
munity; (7) a demonstration of the hazards presented by the enforcement of the statute in
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Cultural autonomy is a legitimate goal. However, it is a com-
plex and many-faceted problem which raises numerous questions.
How does one define the culture that is being respected and
preserved?' Does the culture to be protected consist only of those
values, traditionally held from a prior time? If so, from what time?
Does cultural autonomy instead mean the right for a culture to
evolve? Assuming that a culture is best defined internally, are all
internal definitions inherently valid? Is cultural autonomy possi-
ble at all in today's world of increased interdependence? Is Native
American culture now so adulterated by white influences that it
makes no sense to speak of preserving it?87 Are not the procedures
and rules at issue, including those in Martinez, frequently those
that have been adopted as concessions or adaptations to white
society, rather than expressions of a separate culture7
The issue of cultural autonomy is further complicated by the
ramifications of sovereignty. Martinez is merely another example
of the ambivalent sentiments of the white courts, the white
legislatures, and ultimately, the white people. Sovereignty may
well be a bogus issue, for while the sovereignty of Native
American peoples has been repeatedly upheld,"8 that same
sovereignty has been curtailed under the euphemism of guardian-
ship when expedient for white objectives." Similarly, it has been
manipulated to serve the goals of whites."
Even assuming that native tribes possess more than the trap-
pings of sovereignty, should any group, by virtue of sovereignty,
question; (8) a demonstration of the adequacy of the alternative mode of life; (9) a convinc-
ing showing that few other groups could qualify for the exemption. See Ziontz, supra note
12, at 53-56, for criticism of this possible application of Yoderas narrow and insensitive to
tribal integrity. But see de Raismes, supra note 12, at 82-90, for a discussion supporting a
Yoderanalysis as an appropriate limit on the Indian Civil Rights Act.
86. Not only are there different cultural philosophies represented among tribes, but also
there exist differences in perspective within a given tribe. See Burnett, supra note 2, at 574-
602 for a narration of the variety of reactions by Indians to proposals for the Indian Civil
Rights Act. There are specific allusions to Pueblo communities and their reactions. Id. at
601, 614-15.
87. See Bysiewicz & Van de Mark, The Legal Status of the Dakota Indian Woman, 3
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 255 (1975) for an example of such adulteration. The authors discuss in
detail the negative impact of white culture upon the traditional status of Dakota women.
See also the discussion in Burnett, supra note 2. at 657-59, concerning the white origins of
the present tribal court system.
88. See note 3, supra, and accompanying text.
89. See note 4, supra, and accompanying text. See also Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States, 348 U.S. 272, 290-91 (1955).
90. See Burnett, supra note 2, at 559-60, for a discussion of white creation and retention
of native police forces and courts to set examples of acculturation and to undermine
recalcitrant chieftains and councils.
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be able to utilize cultural structures that destroy or limit the
growth and potential of whole classes of human beings?
Examination of this question in the abstract presents an insolu-
ble dilemma. The entities identified as destructive will vary depend-
ing upon who is doing the identifying. Realistically, all one can do
in addressing these complex issues is to remain constantly aware
of the tension between cultural values and the inherent biases each
person possesses. In Martinez, such awareness is particularly dif-
ficult. No separate, recognized "women's culture" exists. Yet, the
conflict must be viewed as involving differences in sexual values as
well as differences in racial/ethnic values. Sexual values are not
merely a function of racial/ethnic culture.
Conclusion
The federal court system has been less than totally successful in
exercising a self-awareness of bias and a sensitivity to differences
in sexual values.9 The district court in its decision on the merits in
Martinez seemed oblivious to this aspect of concern. One wonders
whether the Supreme Court would have reached a different result
in resolving the tension between racial/ethnic cultures had some
interest more central to white male institutions been in conflict
with the sovereignty and cultural autonomy of Native Americans.
On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit's decision illustrates a sen-
sitive consideration of all the relevant values. The Martinez panel
made a detailed analysis, identifying each party's interest." The
91. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1973) and Gilbert v. General Electric,
429 U.S. 125 (1976) (the Court found that discrimination in employment benefits based on
pregnancy was not sex discrimination); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (Florida tax
law giving exemption to widows but not widowers was not impermissible sex discrimina-
tion).
The Canadian government and Canadian Indians have faced the same problem of resolv-
ing the idea of cultural autonomy with individual rights. In In re Lavell, 38 D.L.R. 3d 481
(Sup. Ct. 1973), § 12(1)(b) of the Indian Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 1-6 (1970) was challenged.
This section provides that an Indian woman loses her status as an Indian if she marries a
non-Indian. Plaintiffs contended this section violated the equal protection provision of the
Canadian Bill of Rights. However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning
that equal protection referred only to nondiscriminatory application of the laws. This case
is even more disturbing in its implications than many United States cases because the rule
being upheld is not one promulgated by a tribal authority, but rather one legislated by the
dominant culture. This indicates that sexism is recognized as the destructive force it is even
to a lesser degree outside the United States. See Sanders, Status of Indian Women on Mar-
riage to Person Without Indian Status, 38 SASKATCHEWAN L. REV. 243 (1974), and Note,
Civil Rights: Loss of Indian Status by Indian Woman Marrying Non-Indian under Indian
Act (Can.), § 12(1)(b), 6 OTT. L. REV. 635 (1974), for differing views on the Lavellcase.
92. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1041-48 (10th Cir. 1976).
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court then balanced these interests acknowledging the differences
in sexual values as well as racial/ethnic values.'
Beyond intervention, the tribe itself must again critically ex-
amine the issues raised in Martinez. The district court found that,
"To abrogate tribal decisions, particularly in the delicate area of
membership, for whatever 'good' reasons, is to destroy cultural
identity under the guise of saving it." 4 Likewise, the effect of the
tribe's use of a sex-based criterion to exclude from membership
those who would be culturally and racially identified as Santa
Clarans, but for the sex of the Santa Claran parent, is to diminish
its human resources under the guise of preserving them.
93. Id. at 1047. The Martinez panel did not clearly set forth the standard it used to
balance these interests. It merely stated that under the fourteenth amendment the ordinance
would clearly be invalid because of its classification scheme based solely on sex." Id. at
1046. Some insight into the Martinezpanel's conclusion may be gained from a review of the
development of the law by the Supreme Court concerning equal protection. See note 54,
supra.
94. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 18-19 (D.N.M. 1975).
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